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Cooperative versus argumentative
communication
Robert van Rooij∗
Re´sume´ : En pragmatique, la the´orie de l’usage du langage, on suppose habi-
tuellement que la communication est une affaire coope´rative. Cette conception
standard a e´te´ re´cemment attaque´e par Ducrot et Merin, et il a e´te´ avance´
qu’un point de vue argumentatif sur l’usage du langage naturel serait plus
approprie´. Dans cet article, je discute la question de savoir dans quelle me-
sure cette attaque est justifie´e et si le point de vue alternatif peut fournir une
analyse plus ade´quate de la « signification pragmatique », a` savoir les impli-
catures.
Abstract: In pragmatics, the theory of language use, it is standard to assume
that communication is a cooperative affair. Recently, this standard view has
come under attack by Ducrot and Merin, and it has been proposed that an
argumentative view on natural language use is more appropriate. In this paper
I discuss to what extent this attack is justified and whether the alternative view
can provide a more adequate analysis of ‘pragmatic meaning’, i.e., implicatures.
∗The research of this work is supported by a fellowship from the Royal Nether-
lands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), which is gratefully acknowledged. For
writing this paper I profited a lot from discussions with Katrin Schulz on exhaustive
interpretation and Merin’s analysis of implicatures. Thanks also to Martin Stokhof
and an anonymous reviewer for their comments. A longer version of this paper can
be found at http://turing.wins.uva.nl/vanrooy.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that a speaker in a typical conversational situation
communicates more by the use of a sentence than just its conventional
truth conditional meaning. Truth conditional meaning is enriched with
what is conversationally implicated by the use of a sentence. In pragmat-
ics – the study of language use – it is standard to assume that this way
of enriching conventional meaning is possible because we assume speak-
ers to conform to Grice’s cooperative principle [Grice 1967], the principle
that assumes speakers to be rational cooperative language users. This
view on language use suggests that the paradigmatic discourse situation
is one of cooperative information exchange.
[Merin 1999] has recently argued that this view is false, and hypoth-
esized that discourse situations are paradigmatically ones of explicit or
tacit debate. He bases this hypothesis on the work of [Ducrot 1973] and
[Anscombre & Ducrot 1983] where it is strongly suggested that some
phenomena troublesome for Gricean pragmatics can be analyzed more
successfully when we assume language users to have an argumentative
orientation. In section 2 I will describe Merin’s analysis of some im-
plicatures which are taken to be troublesome for a cooperative view on
language use. Section 3 will be used to analyze these implicature from
a cooperative point of view after all.
2 Merin’s approach to scalar reasoning
[Anscombre & Ducrot 1983] argue that to account for so-called ‘scalar
implicatures’ an argumentative view is required. Scalar implicatures are
normally claimed to be based on Grice’s maxim of quantity: the require-
ment to say as much as one can (about a topic of conversation). This
gives rise to the principle that everything ‘higher’ on a scale than what is
said is false, where the ordering on the scales is defined in terms of infor-
mativity. Standardly, scales are taken to be of the form 〈P (k), ..., P (m)〉,
where P is a simple predicate (e.g. Mary has x children) and for each
P (i) higher on the scale than P (j), the former must be more informative
than the latter. From the assertion that P (j) is true we then conclude
by scalar implicature that P (i) is false. For instance, if Mary says that
she has two children, we (by default) conclude that she doesn’t have
three children, because otherwise she could and should have said so (if
the number of children is under discussion). Other examples are scales
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like 〈a ∧ b, a ∨ b〉: from the claim that John or Mary will come, we are
normally allowed to conclude that they do not come both.
Unfortunately, as observed by [Hirschberg 1985] and others, we see
inferences from what is not said to what is false very similar to the ones
above, but where what is concluded to be false is not more informative
than, or does not entail, what is actually said. Such scalar inferences are,
according to Anscombre & Ducrot, best accounted for in terms of an ar-
gumentative view on language. Ducrot and Anscombre did not formalize
their rhetorico-pragmatic theory of argumentation. [Merin 1999] set him-
self to the task of removing this obstacle and proposes a formalization
of their intuitions by making use of the theory of games and decisions.
In particular, in [Merin 1999] he proposes to model communication as a
bargaining game between two agents who have dual preferences with re-
spect to a dichotomic epistemic issue: the question whether a particular
proposition h is true or false: If one agent prefers h to be true, the other
prefers it to be false. These preferences (together with the beliefs) are
used to determine a precise notion of relevance of new pieces of informa-
tion, and he uses this notion to characterize the circumstances in which
certain expressions can be used appropriately, and to account for scalar
implicatures.
Merin proposes to use Good’s notion of ‘weight of evidence’ [Good
1950] as his notion of relevance. It is defined with respect to a context
represented by a probability function P and a goal proposition h as fol-
lows R(h, a) = log P (a/h)P (a/¬h) . Naturally, Merin calls proposition a positively
relevant to h iff R(h, a) > 0. Similarly, a is called negatively relevant and
irrelevant iff R(h, a) < 0 and R(h, a) = 0, respectively. The fact that
informative propositions can be negatively relevant will be important for
Merin’s analysis of linguistic data.
In terms of R(·, ·) Merin can explain scalar reasoning that cannot be
accounted for in terms of the standard assumption that scales have to
be ordered in terms of informativity. For instance, if Mary answers at
her job-interview the question whether she speaks French by saying that
her husband does, we conclude that she doesn’t speak French herself,
although this is not semantically entailed by Mary’s answer. If h is
the proposition ‘Mary gets the job’ – which seems only natural –, her
actual answer will have a lower ‘R(h, ·)’-value than the claim that she
speaks French herself. Thus, her actual claim, and the claim that she did
not make can be ordered in a scale defined by the R(h, ·) values, from
which we can derive what is not the case by reasoning with the standard
principle that speakers should make their strongest claim possible.
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Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this natural reasoning schema is not
adopted by [Merin 1999, 2003]. In fact, he doesn’t want to account
for conversational implicatures in terms of the standard principle that
everything is false that the speaker didn’t say, but could have said (ba-
sically, the principle of exhaustive interpretation). Instead, he proposes
to derive scalar implicatures from the assumption that all conversation
is a bargaining game in which the preferences of the agents are diamet-
rically opposed. From this view on communication, it follows that as-
sertions and concessions have an ‘at least’ and ‘at most’ interpretation.
This intuition is formalized in terms of Merin’s definition of relevance
cones defined with respect to contexts represented as 〈P, h〉 (I minimally
changed [Merin 1999] actual definition 8 on page 197.)
Definition 1. The upward (relevance) cone ≥Sφ of an element φ of a
subset S ⊆ F of propositions in context 〈P, h〉 is the union of propositions
in S that are at least as relevant to h with respect to P as φ is. The
downward (relevance) cone ≤Sφ of φ in context 〈P, h〉 is, dually, the
union of S-propositions at most as relevant to h with respect to P as φ
is.
On the basis of his view of communication as a bargaining game,
Merin hypothesizes that while the upward cone of a proposition repre-
sents the speaker’s claim, the downward cone represents the hearer’s de-
fault expected compatible counterclaim (i.e., concession). Net meaning,
then is proposed to be the intersection of speaker’s claim and hearer’s
counterclaim: ≥Sφ ∩ ≤Sφ, the intersection of what is asserted with what
is conversationally implicated.
In the following I will discuss some phenomena concerning scalar
reasoning explicitly discussed by [Merin 1999, 2003] where it is claimed
that taking an argumentative view on language use has considerable
payoff.
Numerals Merin’s analysis of conversational implicatures, and the
way it differs from the standard Gricean analysis, can perhaps best be
illustrated with numerical expressions. In standard Gricean pragmat-
ics it is assumed that numerals have an ‘at least’-meaning. The reason
why we conclude from the assertion John has three children that John
has exactly three children is then due to a conversational implicature:
the stronger sentence John has (at least) four children is entailed to be
false. A well-known problem for this analysis is that it also predicts an
‘exactly’-reading when it is explicitly stated that John has at least three
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children, which we don’t want. [Merin 2003] proposes that numerical
expressions have semantically an ‘exactly’-meaning, and takes ‘at least’
to be a modifier. Such an analysis, of course, has to explain the differ-
ence in acceptability between the appropriate John has three children, in
fact four versus the inappropriate John has four children, in fact three.
Merin proposes to account for this in terms of the notions of upward and
downward cones.
Take φ to be the proposition that John has three children, and sup-
pose that, for some reason, the speaker wants John to have as many
children as possible. Then, the upper cone of φ, i.e. ≥Sφ, should be
thought of as the union of propositions of the form John has n children,
with n ≥ 3, and thus claims that John has at least 3 children. The
downward cone, ≤Sφ, is now of course the union of propositions of the
form John has n children, with n ≤ 3, meaning that John has at most
three children. The appropriateness of John has three children, in fact
four versus the inappropriateness of John has three children, in fact two
can now be accounted for in terms of whether what is claimed by the first
conjunct, ≥Sφ, is consistent with the meaning of the second conjunct.
The net meaning of a sentence was defined as the intersection of
its upward and downward cones: ≥Sφ ∩ ≤Sφ. Observe that when φ
is an element of S, φ itself will be a subset of ≥Sφ ∩ ≤Sφ as well.
Thus, if φ ∈ S, the net meaning of φ cannot be any stronger than
the semantic meaning of φ, though it could be weaker!1 Indeed, with
respect to normal numerical expressions, Merin’s analysis of implicatures
is somewhat unexciting. The analysis is still interesting, because for ‘at
least’ sentences it gives better predictions then the standard Gricean
analysis does: the downward cone of ‘At least three men came’ is the set
of all states (of the world). As a consequence, the latter sentence doesn’t
give rise to the unwanted ‘exactly’-implicature.
Temperature expressions Temperature scales are problematic for
the standard Gricean picture. Intuitively, we conclude from It is warm
that it is not hot, and from It is cold that it is not freezing. But what
should the meanings be of these coarse-grained temperature expressions
to predict these intuitions? The former inference is easy: we say that it is
warm if it is at least, say, 15 oC, and hot if it is, say, at least 25 oC. Thus,
the proposition claiming that it is hot entails the proposition that it is
warm, and we can by standard Gricean reasoning account for the first
intuition. Moreover, by assuming that these expressions have at an ‘at
1I owe this simple but still rather critical observation to Katrin Schulz.
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least’-meaning, we can immediately account for the phenomenon of scale
reversal: the fact that from the scale 〈boiling, hot, warm, ...〉 we can
derive 〈..., not warm, not hot, not boiling〉. This follows immediately by
contraposition: if a entails b, by contraposition we immediately predict
that ¬b entails ¬a. Thus, from the assertion It is not hot we can derive
by scalar implication that the stronger It is not warm is false, and thus
that it is warm but not hot, i.e., somewhere between 15 and 25 oC.
Unfortunately, to account for the intuition that from It is cold we
conclude that it is not freezing, an ‘at least’ reading of coarse-grained
temperature expressions gives exactly the wrong reading. [Horn 1972]
observed the problem and proposes to take the following two scales to be
basic: 〈boiling, hot, warm, lukewarm〉 and 〈freezing, cold, cool, tepid〉.
Although it is natural to assume that we do have these two scales, we
would like to see how these scales are related to the meanings of the
coarse-grained temperature expressions and on the basis of what princi-
ple the scales should be defined. Ducrot proposes an ordering in terms
of argumentative value, and [Merin 1999, 2003] proposes a formal im-
plementation. The reason why we have two scales is due to the fact
that some (basic propositions based on) temperature expressions have
a positive value with respect to some suitable chosen h (desiring for a
high temperature), while others have a negative value (or positive w.r.t.
the goal ¬h for a low temperature). Moreover (though this is clearer in
Ducrot’s work than it is in Merin’s), the use of a particular temperature
expression, ‘warm’ versus ‘cold’, indicates what the speaker’s preferences
are, h versus ¬h. But how can we derive the two scales in terms of the
meanings of the expressions? In analogy with his above described analy-
sis of numerals, Merin crucially assumes that the meanings of the set of
coarse-grained temperature expressions partitions the state space. Thus,
‘warm’, for instance, doesn’t mean that it is at least 15 oC, but rather
that the temperature is between 15 and 25 oC, leaving temperatures
above 25 oC to be ‘hot’. Although ‘it is warm’ is now taken to mean
that the temperature is between 15 and 25 oC, what is asserted is still
taken to mean that it is above 15 oC, because this is the upper cone of
its semantic meaning. Still, if we also take the expected concession into
account, we receive the desired reading: ≥[It is warm] ∩ ≤[It is warm] =
[It is warm] = {w ∈ T | the temperature in w is between 15 and 25 oC}.
If scales are not defined in terms of entailment, the standard expla-
nation for scale reversal can no longer be used. How then to account
for it? At first, this seems rather straightforward, for according to the
relevance function used by Merin, it holds that a is more relevant than
b with respect to h if and only if a is less relevant than b with respect to
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¬h. Unfortunately, given the ‘exactly’-readings assumed by Merin, this
doesn’t really help him. Instead, [Merin 1999] proves and makes use of
the following fact:
Fact 1. If a and b are cells of a partition of the possibility space into
propositions and R(h, a) > R(h, b) > 0, then R(¬h,<S b) > R(¬h,<S a) >
0 (and R(h,≥S a) ≥ R(h,≥S b) > R(h, b)).
What we want to explain is that if a is ‘better’ than b, ‘not b’ is
‘better’ than ‘not a’. Think now of ‘not a’ as as expression denoting
≥S [a] = <S [a], and that it is made with respect to the opposite ‘goal’ as
‘a’ would be. Then it indeed follows that ‘not b’ is higher on the relevant
scale than ‘not a’.
Particularized scalar implicatures Now consider the particularized
scalar implicature due to Mary’s answer at her job interview to the ques-
tion whether she speaks French by saying that her husband does. Obvi-
ously, the goal proposition, h, now is that Mary gets the job. Naturally,
the proposition a = [Mary speaks French] has a higher relevance than
the proposition b = [Mary’s husband speaks French]. The net mean-
ing of Mary’s actual answer is claimed to be ≥Sb =
⋃
{s ∈ S|R(h, s) ≥
R(h, b)} ∩
⋃
{s ∈ S|R(h, s) ≤ R(h, b)} = ≤Sb. Now suppose that b ∈ S.
Then, as always, b ⊆ ≥Sb ∩ ≤Sb, and thus nothing is gained (though
perhaps something is lost). Notice that if b ∈ S, the net meaning of b can
only rule out that Mary herself speaks French, if this is already ruled out
by the semantic meaning of b. So, if Merin assumed that b ∈ S, for the
desired inference to go through, he also had to assume that the seman-
tic meaning of b is something like ‘Mary’s husband speaks French and
nobody else’. Given that [Merin 1999] claims that a and b are (presum-
ably) logical independent, this cannot be what he had in mind. Perhaps
Merin assumed with the rest of us that b has semantically speaking an
‘at least’-meaning saying that Mary’s husband speaks French and per-
haps others do as well. But then, of course, it has to be ruled out that
b ∈ S. This could be done if we assume that S itself partitions the state
space (and, as we have seen above, this is what he normally assumes,
although he is almost never explicit about it). Presumably, this partition
is induced by a question like Who speaks French? On this assumption
it indeed follows that the elements of the partition compatible with a =
[Mary speaks French] are not compatible with the downward cone of b,
and thus are ruled out correctly.
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General scepticism [Merin 1999] contrasts Grice’s view of conversa-
tion as cooperative information exchange with his own argumentative
view on conversation. Unfortunately, Merin’s view – at least on its most
straightforward reading – is in contradiction with general game theoret-
ical results. [Crawford & Sobel 1982] have shown that the amount of
information that agents can transfer credibly in communication games
depends on the extent to which the preferences of the conversational
agents are aligned. If the preferences are diametrically opposed, as pro-
posed by Merin to be the default case, we would predict that no credible
information can be communicated at all! On the other hand, [Lipman &
Seppi 1995] show that communication is possible in real debates when it
cannot be excluded that the information transferred might be falsified,
and that communicating false ‘information’ is punished. The possibil-
ity of falsification and punishment makes the communicative situations
with seemingly non-aligned preferences ones where the preferences are
more aligned after all, but then at a ‘deeper’ level. So I don’t think that
no sense can be made of Merin’s bargaining view on communication at
all, but he has to show us in what ‘deeper’ sense the preferences of the
agents are still aligned.
But even if Merin can provide us with this missing link, his analysis
of conversational implicatures I still find wanting. Although he typically
can account for the phenomena, the hypothesis that conversational impli-
catures result from taking the intersection of the upward and downward
cones is unconvincing.
First, Merin’s proposal is counterintuitive in general: even if in ac-
tual conversation the goals and preferences of its participants are not
always in complete alignment, we certainly do not always argue against
each other. But even if we ignore this counterintuitive aspect of Merin’s
proposal [Merin 1999], his analysis of implicatures is still less than con-
vincing. For numerals and course-grained temperature expressions the
analysis already presupposes what should be explained,2 and to arrive at
the intuitively correct upward and downward cones we have to assume
counterintuitive goal-propositions (the desire for many children and very
high temperatures). For particularized conversational implicatures (and
disjunction) his analysis crucially depends on the identity of the set S
of relevant propositions, and he doesn’t make it very clear why the cho-
sen set should be chosen, nor why the upward and downward cones of a
disjunctive sentence should be as he assumed.
But Merin’s analysis of scalar implicatures should not be ruled out
2Except, of course, for ‘at least’-expressions.
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just because it relies on a view of communcationn which is on one read-
ing incompatible with general game theoretical results, nor because his
treatment is, intuitively speaking, unconvincing. These ‘higher-order’
arguments can be used only if we can account for the same empirical
phenomena in a theoretically more appealing way. In the next section I
will set myself to this task by providing a, perhaps, more familiar and
natural analysis of the implicatures discussed in [Merin 1999, 2003].
3 Scalars and exhaustive interpretation
It makes a lot of sense to assume that (truthful) speakers say as much
as they can about for them desirable situations. In case the speaker is
taken to be well-informed, we can conclude that what speakers do not
say about desirable situations is, in fact, not true. To account for this we
can formulate a ‘pragmatic’ interpretation rule for sceptic hearers that
have to ‘decode’ the message following this reasoning, to hypothesize
what kind of situation the speaker is in. We can call this rule one of
exhaustive interpretation. For this interpretation rule we can assume
that ‘v < w’ if and only if the speaker prefers world w to world v.
Definition 2. Exhaustive interpretation (general)
exh(A) = {w ∈ [A]|¬∃v ∈ [A] : v < w}
Now consider the example of scalar reasoning again that was a serious
problem for standard Gricean analyses: the case where Mary answers at
her job-interview the question whether she speaks French by saying that
her husband does. Intuitively, this gives rise to the scalar implicature
that the ‘better’ answer that Mary herself speaks French is false. Notice
that if we assume the scale to be the preference order (between states)
of the speaker, we can account for this example in terms of the rule of
exhaustive interpretation. All we have to assume for this analysis to
work is that the state where speaker Mary speaks French herself is more
preferred to one where she does not.
In Gricean pragmatics, most conversational implicaturess – the scalar
ones in particular – are due to the second submaxim of quantity, which
requires a speaker to say as much about an issue as she knows to be
true. [Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984] formulated an exhaustivity operator
applied to (term) answers to questions that implements this principle
in a natural way. As it turns out [Van Benthem 1989], this operator is
virtually identical to [McCarthy 1980] rule of interpretation by predicate
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circumscription, which can be given a natural semantic characterization
in terms of a minimal-, or preference-, model analysis.3 Assume that the
(question)-predicate at issue is P (‘who danced?’), and that answer A
(‘John danced’) is given. In that case, the exhaustive interpretation of
A with respect to predicate P , or the circumscription of A with respect
to P , will be the set of A-worlds where P has a minimal extension (John
danced and nobody else):
Definition 3. Exhaustive interpretation with respect to a predicate
exh(A,P ) = {w ∈ [A]|¬∃v ∈ [A] : v <P w}
Thus the exhaustive interpretation of A contains all those states w
that verify A, and for which no more minimal state v exists that also
verifies A. What still has to be specified is the ordering relation ‘<P ’.
In standard circumscription it is assumed that v <P w if the extension
of P in v is a subset of the extension of P in w, i.e. P (v) ⊂ P (w).4
The rule of exhaustive interpretation can be used to account for
scalar implicatures. In definition 3 it crucially relies on a particular
question-predicate. In accordance with, perhaps, more standard anal-
yses of Gricean implicatures (e.g. in the work of [Horn 1972]), we can
also make exhaustification relative to a particular language in question.
The standard analysis of exhaustification can be described alternatively
relative to a particular language L as follows:
Definition 4. Exhaustive interpretation with respect to a language
exh(A,L) = {w ∈ [A]|¬∃v ∈ [A] : {B ∈ L|v ∈ [B]} ⊂ {B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]}}
Obviously, these definitions are equivalent if we take language L to
be defined in terms of predicate P as follows: L = {P (a)|a ∈ NAME},
if we assume that every individual has a (unique) name.
We want to know whether in terms of exhaustive interpretation we
can account for those phenomena for which [Merin 1999] claims an ar-
gumentative view on language use is required. We will take up the
phenomena discussed in section 2 one by one. I would like to mention
that almost none of the assumptions I make below are particularly new
or surpising, though perhaps it has not been very clear how they can be
used to describe the phenomena at hand.
3For the relation between exhaustive interpretation, knowledge, and the Gricean
maxims of conversation, see [Van Rooij & Schulz 2004].
4It is also assumed that with respect to all other predicates P ′, P ′(v) = P ′(w).
This is important for the circumscription analysis of conditionals, for instance, but
won’t bother us in this paper.
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Numerals Just like standard Gricean pragmatics, also the standard
analysis of exhaustive interpretation [Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984] has
problems to account for the fact that the exactly-interpretation of sen-
tences like John has three children is missing for the version modified by
‘at least’. But then, like [Merin 1999, 2003], we can simply assume that
three means something different than at least three. Indeed, let us just as-
sume (temporarily) that [three] = 3. Moreover, let us assume that ‘John
has three children’ is true in state w if 3 is an element of the extension of
property λn[John has n children] in state w. In general, we assume that
P (3) is true in w iff 3 ∈ P (w). Of course, we want to assume that if John
has 3 children, he has 2 children as well. This can be accounted for by
assuming that property λn[John has n children] is monotone downward
entailing. A property P is downward entailing with respect to numerals
iff it holds for all natural numbers n andm and states w that if n ∈ P (w)
and m < n, then also m ∈ P (w). Thus, for downward entailing P , P (3)
entails P (2), but the truth of P (2) does not rule out that also P (3)
is true. In this sense numerals are still predicted to have an ‘at least’
reading when used with a downward-entailing predicate. Obviously, we
also have predicates that denote monotone upward entailing properties,
and properties that don’t behave monotonically at all. An example of
the former kind of predicate is ‘Can run the 100 meters in n seconds’,
while mathematical predicates like ‘3 + n = 7’ are prime examples of
expressions denoting non-monotonic properties.
To account for the fact that John has at least three children doesn’t
give rise to the implicature that he has no more than three children,
we have to slightly change the above analysis: we don’t say anymore
that ‘three’ means 3 and that P (three) is true in w iff 3 ∈ P (w), but
rather with Kadmon (1987) that ‘three’ means {x|card(x) = 3} and
that P (three) is true in w iff ∃x ∈ [three] : x ⊆ P (w). Similarly, we say
that ‘at least three’ means {x|card(x) ≥ 3} and that P (at least three)
is true in w iff ∃x ∈ [at least three] : x ⊆ P (w). Van Rooij & Schulz
(submitted) show that in combination with some standard assumptions
in dynamic semantics, this analysis leads to the correct prediction that
while the exhaustive reading of P (three) gives rise to an exactly reading,
this is not so for P (at least three).
Temperature expressions [Horn 1972] accounts for the implicatures
of temperature terms using two scales: 〈boiling, hot, warm, lukewarm〉
and 〈freezing, cold, cool, tepid〉, while Merin showed that these scales
could, in principle, be derived. However, it is not made clear which
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particular propositions should be at issue to derive those orderings, nor
why only these propositions could be relevant.
Though [Merin 1999] bases his analysis on Ducrot’s general argumen-
tative view on language, Ducrot himself thinks of this argumentative
orientation somewhat differently from Merin. While Merin takes the
argumentative orientation with respect to a contextually given propo-
sition, Ducrot assumes that the argumentative orientation is inherent
to the language itself, and accordingly is context independent. Thus,
it is expressions themselves that have, according to Ducrot, already a
certain argumentative orientation. To take one of Ducrot’s favorite ex-
amples, whereas little has a negative argumentative orientation and can
be used to argue for ‘negative’ conclusions, a little has a positive one.
The same can be said for warm versus cold, they have as part of their
meaning already an argumentative orientation. In logical terms this is
normally expressed by saying that whereas the one has a monotone in-
creasing meaning, the other is monotone decreasing. Suppose that also
warm and cold have a conventional, or ‘semanticized’, argumentative
orientation: the former ‘goes to’ high temperatures and the latter to
low ones. But then we can state the meanings of the two expressions
by [warm] = {n|n ≥ 150C} and [cold] = {n|n ≤ 50C}. The scalar
inferences can now be accounted for by standard exhaustive reasoning.
Let us assume that a statement like It is warm/cold is normally made
if the temperature is at issue. So, to account for the implicatures it seems
natural to assume that the relevant language L consists of coarse-grained
temperature expressions like freezing, cold, cool, tepid, warm, hot, and
boiling. We will assume the following meanings of these expressions:
[freezing] = {n|n ≤ 00C}, [cold] = {n|n ≤ 50C}, [cool] = {n|n < 100C},
[tepid] = {n|n ≥ 100C}, [warm] = {n|n ≥ 150C}, [hot] = {n|n ≥ 250C},
and [boiling] = {n|n ≥ 1000C}. Notice that from these meanings we can
derive the following emtailment relations: boiling |= hot |= warm, and
freezing |= cold |= cool, but that no inference relations exist between
warm and cold, for instance. In fact, if two of the above expressions do
not stand in an inference relation to one another, they are incompatible.
Applying now the exhaustivity operator with respect to a language,5
and assuming that the language L contains of the coarse-grained tem-
perature expressions mentioned above, we immediately can infer from It
is warm that it is not hot, and thus that it is between 15 0C and 25 0C.
Similarly, we can infer from It is cold that it is not freezing, and thus
that it is between 5 0C and 0 0C.
5Of course, doing things in terms of exhaustivity with respect to a predicate would
be equivalent.
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Now consider what we predict for negative statements like It is not
hot. This, of course, depends on what we take to be the relevant lan-
guage. We make the following two constraints on a language with respect
to which we have to apply exhaustification: First, all elements of L have
to be mutually compatible. This means that the relevant temperature
expressions should either be all monotone upward, or monotone down-
ward. It allows {boiling, hot, warm, lukewarm} to be a suitable language
L. The second assumption is that for negative statements we switch to
the following language: L¯
def
= {a¯|a ∈ L} (where a¯ denotes the comple-
ment of a). It is easy to check that now we indeed predict that negation
gives rise to the desired scale-reversion.
In conclusion: we don’t have to associate an argumentative orienta-
tion with temperature expressions to account for the desired conversa-
tional inferences. It is enough to assume that some expressions have a ‘at
least’ and others an ‘at most’ meaning, and that temperature statements
are interpreted exhaustively w.r.t. a suitable language L.
Particularized scalar implicatures Earlier in this section we ac-
counted for the implicature arising from Mary’s answer at her job-inter-
view in terms of the speaker’s preference relation among states. [Merin
1999] proposed that this example should be accounted for in terms of
his relevance relation R(·, ·), while we have shown above how the use
of a language, or a set of alternatives, can be useful for the analysis of
implicatures. Here I want to suggest that we can also account for Mary’s
answer by taking relevance and a particular language into account.
In definitions 3 and 4 we defined our exhaustivity operator (implicitly
or explicitly) in terms of the standard notion of entailment. However, we
can generalize this operator by taking a notion of relevance into account.
In general we can use the following exhaustivity operator, which depends
not only on a language L, but also a goal proposition h and a relevance
function R:
Definition 5. Exhaustive interpretation with respect to relevance
exh(A,L, h) = {w ∈ [A]|¬∃v ∈ [A] : v <Lh w}
Here we assume the following ordering relation between states:
v <Lh w iff R(h,
⋂
{B ∈ L|v ∈ [B]}) < R(h,
⋂
{B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]})
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Assuming h normally to be
⋂
L,6 we see that this new exhaustivity
operator is really a generalization of our earlier ones. Consider now the
set
⋂
{B ∈ L|t |= B} in case predicate P is at issue. It denotes the
proposition that at least all individuals that have property P in state w
actually have property P . That is, it denotes the following proposition:
λi[P (w) ⊆ P (i)]. Van Rooij & Schulz (submitted) show that the result-
ing ordering relation v < w between states mirrors an entailment relation
exactly when all information is relevant. In particular, this shows that
in our special case V (h,
⋂
{B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]}) < V (h,
⋂
{B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]})
if and only if {B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]} ⊂ {B ∈ L|w ∈ [B]}. Thus, in the special
case under discussion, definition 5 reduces to definitions 3 and 4.
However, by making exhaustive interpretation dependent on rele-
vance, we can account for more phenomena than we could until now. In
particular, for the scalar inference resulting from Mary’s answer at her
job-interview.
In this paper I have argued against Merin’s analysis of scalar impli-
catures in terms of his upward and downward cones. But, by taking
relevance into account, for many examples an analysis in terms of ex-
haustive interpretation is in fact very similar to what Merin proposed.
By a clever – though sometimes unnatural – choice of goal proposition
h, it is in most (if not all) cases possible that what we take to be the
semantic meaning of an expression with a monotone increasing meaning
is the same as what he takes to be the upward cone of the proposition
expressed by a phrase with a (semantically) non-monotonic meaning.
Let denote this proposition by A. In those cases, Merin’s intersection of
this resulting upward cone with a proposition’s downward cone will be
the same as our exhaustive interpretation of A.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have contrasted the standard cooperative view on commu-
nication with an argumentative one. According to the former view, we
communicate information that is good for all participants of a conversa-
tion, while according to the latter, we communicate always to argue for
a particular hypothesis and do this always against an opponent. In this
paper I have put some doubts on the universal applicability of the latter
6Notice that this results in the empty set if the elements of L are not mutually
compatible, something that we actually ruled out. But even then this goal proposition
need not be natural, but I just want to show that we could do things in terms of goals
as well.
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view. Though I agree with Ducrot and Merin that an argumentative
perspective is useful for the analysis of (at least) adversary connectives,
adopting this perspective for the analysis of all scalar implicatures (or
at least in the way proposed by Merin) was argued to be unconvinc-
ing. I have argued that a more natural explanation is possible when we
assume speakers to say as much as they can, and hearers to interpret
exhaustively. Although this assumption seems rather standard, it does
not require perfect alignment of preferences as normally presupposed in
Gricean pragmatics. Thus, even if neither the Gricean cooperative view
on language use, nor the alternative argumentative view has universal
applicability, this doesn’t mean that conversational implicatures cannot
still be accounted for by means of a general rule of interpretation. Ob-
viously, I take the principle of exhaustive interpretation to be such a
general rule.
